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Restricting Ex Parte Interviews with Nonparty

Treating Physicians: Crist v. Moffatt
When most people go to the doctor, they expect the information they give
their physician to remain private. Ordinarily, such information will remain private, protected by physician-patient privilege, unless a patient decides to sue for
damages arising out of the doctor's treatment. Physician-patient privilege in
North Carolina is based solely on statute.' In the course of litigation, a plaintiff
may waive this privilege, either expressly or impliedly, or a judge in the proper
court may compel disclosure. 2 After plaintiff waives the privilege, the nonparty
treating physician, although she has expert knowledge, is just like any other fact
witness when testifying about the facts of plaintiff's medical condition relevant
3
to the litigation.
A number of jurisdictions, however, have considered whether the special
nature of the physician-patient relationship requires restricting discovery from a
nonparty treating physician. In particular, these courts have considered
whether to restrict ex parte interviews between the defense counsel and plaintiff's physician. In Crist v. Moffatt 4 the North Carolina Supreme Court affirmed
a trial court order permitting ex parte interviews only after the defendant obtains authorization from the plaintiff5 and thus joined courts of other states that
restrict ex parte contact between defense counsel and plaintiff's physicians.
This Note, after discussing the facts and holding of Crist, traces the history
and development of physician-patient privilege in North Carolina. It then examines the different arguments courts nationwide have encountered in deciding
1. The relevant statutory provision is:
No person, duly authorized to practice physic or surgery, shall be required to disclose any
information which he may have acquired in attending a patient in a professional character,
and which information was necessary to enable him to prescribe for such patient as a
physician, or to do any act for him as a surgeon, and no such information shall be considered public records under G.S. 132-1. Confidential information obtained in medical
records shall be furnished only on the authorization of the patient, or if deceased, the
executor, administrator, or, in the case of unadministered estates, the next of kin. Any
resident or presiding judge in the district, either at the trial or prior thereto, or the Industrial Commission pursuant to law may, subject to G.S. 8-53.6, compel disclosure if in his
opinion disclosure is necessary to a proper administration of justice. If the case is in dis-

trict court the judge shall be a district court judge, and if the case is in superior court the
judge shall be a superior court judge.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-53 (1986). There is no physician-patient privilege at common law. New York
passed the first statute establishing the privilege in 1828. 8 3. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2380, at 81920 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961). The North Carolina version, based on the New York statute, first
appeared in 1885. Sims v. Charlotte Mut. Liberty Ins. Co., 257 N.C. 32, 36, 125 S.E.2d 326, 329
(1962). The only substantive change in the law since 1885 broadens the category ofjudges who may
compel disclosure. This change is discussed infra at note 27.
2. See infra notes 27-45 and accompanying text.
3. "It should be noted that the subsection does not address itself to the expert whose information was not acquired in preparation for trial but rather because he was an actor or viewer with
respect to transactions or occurrences that are part of the subject matter of the lawsuit. Such an
expert should be treated as an ordinary witness." N.C.R. CIv. PRO. 26(b)(4) comment (1990).
4. 326 N.C. 326, 389 S.E.2d 41 (1990).
5. Id. at 336, 389 S.E.2d at 47.
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whether to allow ex parte interviews of physicians after a waiver of the physician-patient privilege. Next the Note analyzes the North Carolina Supreme
Court's decision in Crist and the public policy grounds that underlie it. The
Note maintains that the court correctly decided that some concerns surrounding
the physician-patient relationship survive waiver of the privilege and that,

although these concerns are not sufficient to restrict the information the defendant can obtain, they are strong enough to justify restricting the manner in which
he can obtain it. Nevertheless, this Note questions whether the policies justifying the restriction are equally compelling for every physician who has treated
the patient, and concludes that the burden on the defendant and the judicial
process is too high unless the restrictions apply only to discovery from the patient's current treating physicians. Finally, the Note cautions that an overly
broad application of the principles of Crist to other privileges could have unwarranted and undesirable effects on discovery.
In 1986 Hazel Crist filed a medical malpractice action alleging negligence
by the surgeon who performed abdominal surgery on her in 1983.6 The defendant served interrogatories on the plaintiff asking her to identify whom she would
be calling as witnesses. 7 In response the plaintiff listed one expert witness and
six additional physicians who had treated her since her 1983 surgery, describing
each as a witness who "will testify as to facts and circumstances of his treatment
of [p]laintiff and her condition ' 8 for different periods of time. The defendant
then deposed the plaintiff.9 During the deposition, the plaintiff spoke generally
about her condition and mentioned two of the physicians listed in the responses
to interrogatories. 10
Soon after the deposition, the defendant's attorney contacted two of the
plaintiff's treating physicians and scheduled ex parte interviews with them, advising each that plaintiff had waived her physician-patient privilege." One of
the physicians later contacted the plaintiff and informed her of the interview and
of the defendant's assurances.1 2 The plaintiff then filed a motion asking the trial
court to compel the defendant to turn over all notes from these conversations,
prohibit the use of any information from these conversations at trial, and prohibit any additional ex parte conversations. 13 The trial judge found that,
although the defense attorney had acted in good faith, the ex parte interviews
were improper and granted the requested relief.14
The North Carolina Court of Appeals dismissed defendant's interlocutory
appeal on the ground that no substantial right was affected. 1 5 The North Caro6. Id at 328, 389 S.E.2d at 42.
7. Id. at 328, 389 S.E.2d at 4243.
8. Id. at 328, 389 S.E.2d at 43.

9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 329, 389 S.E.2d at 43.

14. Id.

15. Crist v. Moffatt, 92 N.C. App. 520, 522, 374 S.E.2d 487, 488 (1988), rev'd, 326 N.C. 326,
389 S.E.2d 41 (1990). See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 1-277(a) (1983), 7A-27 (1989) (governing appeals
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lina Supreme Court did not address this issue, instead electing to vacate the
appellate court's opinion under its general supervisory powers.1 6 The court held
that unless plaintiff consents the law does not allow ex parte interviews and
limits defendant to formal discovery procedures. The court reasoned that restricting defendant to formal methods of discovery does not affect the kind of
information to which defendant is entitled, only the manner in which he may
obtain it. 17 Rather than addressing whether participation in discovery constitutes a waiver of the physican-patient privilege, the court based its holding primarily on public policy.' 8
The common law has not recognized a physician-patient privilege.19 Its
statutory form, 20 although pervasive, has not enjoyed unanimous approval in
part because, like any other privilege, it precludes the introduction at trial of
relevant information in favor of a greater societal interest in protecting the underlying relationship. 21 The privilege, therefore, prevents the trier of fact from
having access to potentially helpful information. 22 North Carolina courts traditionally have offered three reasons for support of the privilege: "to induce the
that require either that a substantial right of the party seeking appeal be affected or that the court
order determines the matter in a way that prevents an effective appeal). The court of appeals concluded that since the plaintiff had not impliedly waived her physician-patient privilege by participating in discovery, the defendant had no right to talk to her physicians of which he could be deprived.
Crist, 92 N.C. App. at 522, 374 S.E.2d at 488.
16. Crist, 326 N.C. at 330, 389 S.E.2d at 44. In support of its general supervisory powers, the
court relied on N.C. CONST. art. IV, § 12(1). Id. By deciding to proceed this way instead of simply
reversing the court of appeals, the supreme court did not have to address whether there was a final
order. Discovery orders are interlocutory and do not affect a substantial right. Dworsky v. Travelers Ins. Co., 49 N.C. App. 446, 447, 271 S.E.2d 522, 523 (1980). Only if the "desired discovery
would not have delayed trial or have caused the opposing party any unreasonable annoyance, embarrassment, oppression or undue burden or expense, and if the information desired is highly material
to a determination of the critical question to be resolved in the case" will a discovery order be
considered to have affected a substantial right. Id. at 447-48, 271 S.E.2d at 523 (citing TennesseeCarolina Trans. v. Strick Corp., 291 N.C. 618, 231 S.E.2d 597 (1977)).
17. Crist, 326 N.C. at 332, 389 S.E.2d at 44.
18. Id.
19. "The public interest in the disclosure of all facts relevant to a litigated issue was deemed to
be superior to the policy of recognizing, for the benefit of the patient, the inviolability of confidential
communications." State v. Martin, 182 N.C. 846, 849, 109 S.E. 74, 76 (1921).
20. See supra note 1. For general information on the privilege in North Carolina, see 1 H.
BRANDIS, NORTH CAROLINA EVIDENCE § 63 (3d ed. 1988).
21. There are basically two theories on the function of privilege: the utilitarian and the societal.
The utilitarian argument, advocated by Wigmore, says that a privilege is proper when it meets "four
fundamental conditions": (1) that the communications be confidential, (2) that this confidentiality
be critical to the relationship, (3) that the relationship be one society would like to foster, and
(4) that the possible injury to the relationship be greater than the potential benefit to litigation. 8 J.
WIGMORE, supra note 1, § 2285, at 527. Wigmore argues that the physician-patient relationship
can, at best, meet only conditions (1) and (3) and, therefore, is not a proper relationship for privilege.
Id. The societal argument takes the position that even if the underlying relationship is not affected
or encouraged by the privilege, the privilege is still valid because it "serves to protect the essential
privacy of certain human relationships." E. CLEARY, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 72, at 172 (3d
ed. 1984) (footnote omitted). Whichever side may have the best of the argument, the physicianpatient privilege is now firmly entrenched. See generally Chafee, Privileged Communications: Is
Justice Served or Obstructed by Closing the Doctor'sMouth on the Witness Stand?, 52 YALE L.J. 607
(1943) (addressing this debate and questioning the validity of physician-patient privilege).
22. Wigmore points out that 99% of cases in which a plaintiff claims a physician-patient privilege are either life insurance cases (/e., the insurance company refuses to pay and claims that decedent fraudulently hid a prior medical condition); personal injury cases (including medical
malpractice); or testamentary actions (in which the testator's mental capacity is questioned). 8 J.

1384

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 69

patient to make full disclosure that proper treatment can be given, to prevent
public disclosure of socially stigmatized diseases, and in some instances to protect patients from self-incrimination." ' 23 The privilege protects not only communications with the physician, but also anything the physician may have observed
in the course of all examinations. 24 Furthermore, it extends to information communicated to or observations by a nurse or physician's assistant, provided the
information is received at the direction of the physician, 25 and to hospital and

6
medical records prepared by or at the direction of the physician.2
North Carolina's privilege is unusual because it is qualified: a judge may

"compel disclosure if in his opinion disclosure is necessary to a proper administration of justice."'27 The general rule is that the judge does not have to make a
specific finding that compulsion is necessary to serve justice; this purpose need
only be clear from the record. 28 On the other hand, a judge need not decide
whether to compel disclosure if he finds that the privilege has not arisen at all.

For the privilege to apply, a physician-patient relationship must exist and the
communication must be necessary for treatment. 29 There is no privilege at all in
WIGMORE, supra note 1, § 2380, at 834. In all three situations, he argues, the testimony of the
physician is important in determining the truth. Id.

23. Sims v. Charlotte Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 257 N.C. 32, 36, 125 S.E.2d 326, 329 (1962).
24. Smith v. John L. Roper Lumber Co., 147 N.C. 62, 64, 60 S.E. 717, 718 (1908).
25. See, eg., State v. Bryant, 5 N.C. App. 21, 28-29, 167 S.E.2d 841, 847 (1969) (requiring
court order before disclosure of blood alcohol level when test was taken by a nurse at the direction of
a physician, not a police officer).
26. Sims, 257 N.C. at 38, 125 S.E.2d at 331.
27. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-53 (1986). As discussed supra note 21, Wigmore disapproves of physician-patient privilege. He does, however, refer to North Carolina's statute as "a moderate improvement" because of the ability of the court to compel disclosure. 8 J. WioMoRE, supra note 1,
§ 2380a, at 832.
If the case is in superior court, the judge compelling disclosure must be a superior court judge; if
the case is in district court, the judge must be a district court judge. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-53 (1986).
The requirements concerning the judge were expanded in 1969. Prior to that, the judge had to be the
presiding judge. This change was in response to a developing line of cases that construed very
strictly the judge requirement and limited the power to compel disclosure to the judge presiding at
trial. See In re Albemarle Mental Health Center, 42 N.C. App. 292, 299, 256 S.E.2d 818, 823
(1979); see also Note, A Survey of the North CarolinaLaw of RelationalPrivilege, 50 N.C.L. REv.
630, 644 (1972) (discussing the 1969 amendment). The prior requirement severely limited a litigant's ability to compel disclosure during discovery. See Gustafson v. Gustafson, 272 N.C. 452, 456,
158 S.E.2d 619, 622 (1968); Lockwood v. McCaskill, 261 N.C. 754, 758, 136 S.E.2d 67, 70 (1964);
Johnston v. United Ins. Co. of America, 262 N.C. 253, 256, 136 S.E.2d 587, 590 (1964); Yow v.
Pittman, 241 N.C. 69, 71, 84 S.E.2d 297, 299 (1954).
28. See Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Boddie, 194 N.C. 199, 202, 139 S.E. 228, 229 (1927)
(holding that the finding of necessity must appear in the record). But see State v. Martin, 182 N.C.
846, 850, 109 S.E. 74, 76 (1921) (judge directed physician to testify "no doubt ... because in his
opinion the testimony ... was necessary"); State v. Bryant, 5 N.C. App. 21, 26-27, 167 S.E.2d 841,
847 (1969) (not necessary that the finding be explicit).
29. See, eg., State v. Wade, 197 N.C. 571, 572, 150 S.E. 32, 32 (1929) (statement to physician
not privileged when made after physician had informed the victim that he would not treat her anymore); Smith v. John L. Roper Lumber Co., 147 N.C. 62, 65, 60 S.E. 717, 718-19 (1908) (response to
question "How were you hurt?" not privileged when source of injury made no difference to treatment).
This requirement is particularly important in criminal cases. Although psychiatrists, like physicians, are covered under N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-53 (1986) and psychologists are covered under their
own statute, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-53.3 (Supp. 1990), communications between these mental health
professionals and an inmate are not protected because the purpose is assessment rather than treat-
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child abuse cases, 30 but the privilege is buttressed in the divorce or alimony
31
setting in which the physician is actually incompetent to testify.
Although a judge can compel disclosure, only the patient can waive the
privilege. 32 A waiver can be express, either in a writing prepared for trial or in a
contract, such as a life insurance policy that includes a clause waiving the privilege. 33 Based on plaintiff's actions, a court may also hold that she has waived
her privilege impliedly. In Capps v. Lynch 34 the North Carolina Supreme Court
set forth the standard for determining when an implied waiver has occurred.
The plaintiff in Capps testified in detail about his injury and subsequent surgery. 35 The court held that the plaintiff impliedly had waived his physicianpatient privilege: "[a] patient may surrender his privilege in a personal injury
case by testifying to the nature and extent of his injuries and the examination
and treatment by the physician or surgeon." 36 Implied waiver also may occur
when a plaintiff fails to object when the defendant calls his treating physician as

37
a witness or when a plaintiff testifies about conversations with his physician.

The court went on to explain, however, that implied waiver is not automatic
whenever a plaintiff testifies. Instead, "[tihe question of waiver is to be deter' '3
mined largely by the facts and circumstances of the particular case on trial. 8
Instead of determining on a case by case basis whether plaintiff has waived
the privilege, some courts have instituted a bright-line rule that waiver results
from filing a suit in which plaintiff's medical condition is at issue. 39 In 1987

North Carolina chose not to follow this route and reaffirmed the use of the
ment. State v. Taylor, 304 N.C. 249, 271, 283 S.E.2d 761, 776 (1981), cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1213
(1983); State v. Newsome, 195 N.C. 552, 559-60, 143 S.E. 187, 191 (1928).
30. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 8-53.1 (1986), 7A-551 (1989). See State v. Efrid, 309 N.C. 802, 805,
309 S.E.2d 228, 230 (1983). In fact, North Carolina law compels health care professionals to report
suspected incidents of child abuse. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-543 (1989).
31. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-53.6 (1986). A physician, psychologist, or marital family therapist
who provides marital counseling to either or both parties is incompetent to testify in an alimony or
divorce action. When a witness is incompetent, either party or the court can object to that witness
testifying. When privilege is involved, however, only the holder of the privilege, here the patient, can
object. I H. BRANDIs,supra note 20, § 54, at 247 n.23.
32. See, eg., Capps v. Lynch, 253 N.C. 18, 22, 116 S.E.2d 137, 140 (1960) (stating that the
privilege is the patient's); Martin, 182 N.C. at 850, 109 S.E. at 76 (stating that the privilege is the
patient's alone; the defendant cannot invoke it); John L. Roper Lumber Co., 147 N.C. at 64, 60 S.E.
at 718 (privilege is patient's to waive); 1 H. BRANDIS, supra note 20, § 63, at 250-51.
33. Fuller v. Knights of Pythias, 129 N.C. 318, 324, 40 S.E. 65, 67 (1901). But cf.Johnston v.
United Ins. Co. of America, 262 N.C. 253, 255, 136 S.E.2d 587, 590 (1964) (holding ambiguous a
provision allowing insured's physicians to disclose information to the extent not prohibited by law).
34. 253 N.C. 18, 116 S.E.2d 137 (1960).
35. Id. at 23-24, 116 S.E.2d at 142.
36. Id. at 23, 116 S.E.2d at 141.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. See, e.g., Trans-World Invs., Inc. v. Drobny, 554 P.2d 1148, 1151 (Alaska 1976); Jaap v.
District Court of Eighth Judicial Dist., 191 Mont. 319, 321-22, 623 P.2d 1389, 1390-91 (1981);
Annotation, Commencing Action Involving Physical Condition of Plaintiffor Decedent as Waiving
Physician-PatientPrivilege as to Discovery Proceedings, 21 A.L.R.3d 912 (1968).
Another approach is that of Delaware. There, no physician-patient privilege ever arises because
an exception provides that there is no privilege when a suit is filed in which plaintiff's medical
condition is at issue. DEL. R. EVID. 503(d)(3). See, eg., Green v. Bloodsworth, 501 A.2d 1257,
1258 & n.1 (Del. 1985).
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Capps fact-based method in Cates v. Wilson, 4° a medical malpractice case. In
Gates, the plaintiff called the defendant doctor as an adverse witness and ques-

tioned him about visits, diagnoses, and treatment. 4 1 The plaintiff then testified
about her visits with the defendant and with other physicians, and offered medical records into evidence. 42 When the defendant tried to ask the plaintiff's physicians their opinions of the defendant's care, however, the plaintiff objected that
these questions violated her physician-patient privilege. 4 3 The court disagreed

and, using the Capps test, held that the plaintiff waived her privilege. 44 The
court considered adopting a bright-line rule of automatic waiver, but rejected
this approach as inconsistent with the "fact specific analysis of Capps."45
The court's refusal to adopt a bright-line rule leaves defense counsel uncertain in any given case whether plaintiff has waived the privilege absent a judicial
finding of waiver or an order compelling disclosure. What constitutes an implied waiver in the pretrial setting is unclear: both Gates and Capps considered
the plaintiff's actions at trial, not during discovery. 46 A related question, and
the one on which the court chose to focus, is whether, despite a waiver, physicians should be treated like other fact witnesses.
A number of courts across the country have considered whether the defendant can conduct informal ex parte interviews with the physician after a plaintiff
has waived her privilege. 47 The treating physician is not an expert witness.
Although perhaps qualified to give an expert opinion as to what caused the problem, in this situation the physician is an ordinary witness as to the facts and

circumstances surrounding plaintiff's illness or injury. If the physician witnessed an automobile accident, either side would be able to talk informally with
her. There are cases, however, where the physician is a witness and plaintiff's

medical condition is at issue. Should that matter? Some courts have held that
once the privilege is waived, the physician is no longer protected. 48 Others have
held the contrary. 49 The question ultimately is one of balancing. If protecting
40. 321 N.C. 1, 361 S.E.2d 734 (1987).
41. Id. at 11, 361 S.E.2d at 741.
42. Id. at 11-12, 361 S.E.2d at 741.
43. Id. at 13, 361 S.E.2d at 741.
44. Id. at 14, 361 S.E.2d at 743.
45. Id. at 16-17, 361 S.E.2d at 743.
46. Id. at 11-12, 361 S.E.2d at 741-42; Capps v. Lynch, 253 N.C. 18, 19-20, 116 S.E.2d 137, 139
(1960). This question remains unanswered after Crist because the court declined to discuss defendant's assignment of error that the trial court should have found that the plaintiff impliedly waived
her privilege. This issue is of substantially less importance, however, in light of the court's holding
that there can be no ex parte interviews even if the privilege has been waived. Crist, 326 N.C. at 336,
389 S.E.2d at 47. Pretrial waiver would arise only in the context of requests for medical records. If
plaintiff resists turning these records over, the opposing party can apply for a court order compelling
disclosure. Cases considering pretrial waiver are collected at Annotation, PretrialTestimony orDisclosure on Discovery By Party to Personal Injury Action as to Nature of Injuries or Treatment as
Waiver of Physician-PatientPrivilege, 25 A.L.R.3d 1401 (1969) (Generally, voluntary action can
constitute a waiver, but participation in discovery requested by opposing party is not voluntary and
therefore cannot be the basis for a waiver.).
47. Many of these cases are collected in Annotation, Discovery: Right to Ex ParteInterview
with InjuredParty's Treating Physician, 50 A.L.R.4th 714 (1986).
48. See infra notes 50-71 and accompanying text.
49. See infra notes 72-109 and accompanying text.
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the physician-patient relationship is more important than allowing a search for
facts by any legitimate means, courts should restrict ex parte interviews; if the
search for facts is more important, courts should allow them.
Alaska is one of the leading jurisdictions that have allowed ex parte interviews.5 0 Three times in the last fourteen years, 51 the Alaska Supreme Court has
considered whether any protection of the physician-patient privilege should survive waiver. Each time the court has refused to restrict ex parte interviews between defense counsel and the plaintiff's treating physicians.
In Trans-WorldInvestments v. Drobny52 the Alaska Supreme Court consolidated two personal injury actions. Alaska previously had held that a plaintiff,
upon filing suit, automatically waives the physician-patient privilege as to all
matters relevant to her claim.5 3 The plaintiff in Trans-World argued, however,
that the defendant must use only formal discovery as provided by the Alaska
54
Rules of Civil Procedure, not informal conferences, to acquire the information.
The court rejected this argumeht for two reasons. First, there are no legal restrictions on informal discovery.5 5 Second, the law should encourage informality because "informal methods... facilitate early evaluation and settlement of
cases, with a resulting decrease in'5litigation
costs, and represent further the wise
6
application of judicial resources."
Subsequently, in Arctic Motor Freight,Inc. v. Stover,57 the court affirmed
and clarified its holding in Trans-World: although waiver allows defense counsel
to seek information from plaintiff's physician, it does not require the physician
50. The Alaska Supreme Court first approved this practice in Trans-World Invs., Inc. v.
Drobny, 554 P.2d 1148, 1151-52 (Alaska 1976), then affirmed this position in Arctic Motor Freight,
Inc. v. Stover, 571 P.2d 1006, 1008 (Alaska 1977) and Langdon v. Champion, 74.5 P.2d 1371, 1375
(Alaska 1987). Other courts taking this position include Delaware, see Green v. Bloodsworth, 501

A.2d 1257, 1258 (Del. 1985); Florida, see Coralluzzo v. Fass, 450 So. 2d 858, 859 (Fla. 1984); New
Jersey, see Lazorick v. Brown, 195 N.J. Super. 444, 456-57, 480 A.2d 223, 230 (1984); and the U.S.
District Court for the District of Columbia, see Doe v. Eli Lilly & Co., 99 F.R.D. 126, 129 (D.D.C.
1983).
Missouri originally allowed ex parte interviews. Missouri ex rel. Stuffiebamn v. Appelquist, 694
S.W.2d 882, 888 (Mo. App. 1985). This case recently has been overruled, however, and Missouri
now prohibits ex parte interviews. Missouri ex rel. Woytus v. Ryan, 776 S.W.2d 389, 395 (Mo.
1989) (en banc).
51. See supra note 50. The U.S. District Court for the District of Alaska refused to allow ex
parte interviews in Garner v. Ford Motor Co., 61 F.R.D. 22, 24 (D. Alaska 1973), but in federal
courts the state law of privilege controls, and Alaska law now allows ex parte interviews. F. JAMES
& F. HAZARD, CIVIL PROCEDURE, § 5.9, at 246 (3d ed. 1985).
52. 554 P.2d 1150 (Alaska 1976).
53. Id. at 1151. The court earlier had pointed out its reasoning behind the immediate waiver:
"Increasingly it is being held that common sense dictates against enforcing the privilege until it has
actually been waived during trial, as it almost invariably must be, and then in fairness being required
to grant the defendant's request for a continuance to meet the new matter disclosed." Mathis v.
Hilderbrand, 416 P.2d 8, 10 (Alaska 1966).
54. Trans-World Ins., 554 P.2d at 1151.
55. Id. The lack of a prohibition on informal discovery is one of the major arguments used by
courts refusing to restrict ex parte interviews: "there is nothing in the Court Rules or the law of
evidence that prohibits an attorney from obtaining unprivileged information through informal discussions with a potential witness." Lazorick v. Brown, 195 N.J. Super. 444, 450, 480 A.2d 223, 226
(1984).
56. Trans-WorldInvs., 554 P.2d at 1152.
57. 571 P.2d 1006 (Alaska 1977).
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to provide that information to defense counsel. 58 Other courts also have drawn
this distinction. For example, New Jersey does not follow the automatic waiver
rule, but the court will order a plaintiff to execute a waiver and allow informal
discovery. 59 The New Jersey courts nevertheless take the same position as the
Alaska courts and will not order a physician to participate in an informal
6o
interview.
The United States District Court for the District of Columbia also has refused to restrict ex parte interviews. In Doe v. Eli Lilly & Co.61 a suit against the
manufacturers of the fertility drug DES, the plaintiffs acknowledged that they
either already had or would soon have to waive their physician-patient privi-

leges. 62 The plaintiffs resisted informal interviews between their physicians and

the defense counsel, however, arguing that the interviews would influence the
physicians' testimony. 63 The court rejected this argument, finding that the sanctions available for improper influence offered sufficient protection against the
plaintiffs' concerns.6 4 The court also concluded, as had the Alaska Supreme
Court, that informal discovery should be favored because it is less difficult to
arrange, less expensive, and generally a more "cost-efficient means of eliminating
non-essential witnesses." 65 Furthermore, the court argued, restrictions on ex
parte interviews would allow one party to have greater control than the other
over a fact witness, contrary to the court's belief that "no party to litigation has
anything resembling a proprietary right to any witness' evidence. Absent a privilege, no party is entitled to restrict an opponent's access to a witness, however
66
partial or important to him, by insisting upon some notion of allegiance."
That the court's ruling does not provide for informal discovery techniques
makes no difference: "while [the rules of civil procedure] have provided certain
specific formal methods of acquiring evidence from recalcitrant sources by compulsion, they have never been thought to preclude the use of such venerable, if
informal, discovery techniques as the ex parte interview of a witness who is willing to speak." 67

The court rejected a compromise position that would allow a plaintiff's attorney to be present during the interview because this would unfairly reveal the
58. Id. at 1009. In Langdon v. Champion, 745 P.2d 1371 (Alaska 1987), the Alaska Supreme
Court's most recent case on this issue, the court explicitly declined to overturn its previous decisions
and restrict ex parte interviews. Id. at 1375 n.8.
59. Lazorick, 195 N.J. Super. at 457, 480 A.2d at 230.
60. Id.; accord Doe v. Eli Lilly & Co., 99 F.R.D. 126, 128 (D.D.C. 1983). Decisions such as
Lazorick, which require the plaintiff to execute a waiver, provide more protections to the plaintiff
because of the nature of the procedure. In requesting a waiver, the defendant thereby gives the
plaintiff notice that the interview will take place. Notice gives the plaintiff's attorney a chance to
talk with the physician, explain that she does not have to participate in informal discovery and make
clear which issues are relevant and which issues the physician-patient privilege prohibits her from
discussing.
61. 99 F.R.D. 126 (D.D.C. 1983)
62. Id. at 127.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 128.
65. Id.

66. Id.
67. Id.; accord Coralluzzo v. Fass, 450 So. 2d 858, 859 (Fla. 1984).
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defense attorney's work product. 68 The defense counsel's questions and the issues pursued could reveal trial strategy to the plaintiff; likewise, the defense attorney's absence at interviews between the plaintiff's attorney and the treating

physician would not create the same opportunity to view the plaintiff's trial
preparation.
Other courts refusing to restrict ex parte interviews have tended to follow
the logic of the Alaska and District of Columbia courts. In general, these courts
have focused on the perceived unfair advantage of allowing only plaintiff the

opportunity to speak informally with nonparty treating physicians. 69 Furthermore, all of these courts either explicitly or implicitly reject the public policy
arguments for restricting ex parte interviews.70 In terms of the basic balancing
test discussed above, "the justice system should [not] pay this price [the inevitable impediment of the search for truth] so that the doctor-patient relationship
'7 1
will not be bruised."

Many jurisdictions prohibit ex parte interviews 72 even when there is no
physician-patient privilege. 73 These courts have focused not on the lack of
prohibitions in the rules, but rather on the lack of any provisions providing for
68. Doe, 99 F.R.D. at 128; accord Green v. Bloodsworth, 501 A.2d 1257, 1258 (Del. 1985).
69. "The privilege was never intended... to be used as a trial tactic by which a party entitled to
invoke it may control to his advantage the timing and circumstances of the release of information he
must inevitably see revealed at some time." Doe, 99 F.R.D. at 128.
70. Langdon v. Champion, 745 P.2d 1371, 1375 n.8 (Alaska 1987); Green, 501 A.2d at 1258.
The public policy arguments are discussed infra notes 77-105 and accompanying text.
71. Lazorick v. Brown, 195 N.J. Super. 444, 456, 480 A.2d 223, 230 (1984).
72. Jurisdictions that prohibit ex parte interviews are Arizona, see Duquette v. Superior Court,
161 Ariz. 269, 272, 778 P.2d 634, 637 (Ct. App. 1989); Colorado, see Fields v. McNamara, 189 Colo.
284, 286, 540 P.2d 327, 329 (1975); Illinois, see Petrillo v. Syntex Laboratories, 148 Ill.
App. 3d 581,
588, 499 N.E.2d 952, 957 (1986), appeal denied, 113 IM. 2d 584, 505 N.E.2d 361, cert. denied sub
nom. Tobin v. Petrillo, 483 U.S. 1007 (1987); Iowa, see Roosevelt Hotel Ltd. Partnership v. Sweeney,
394 N.W.2d 353, 356 (Iowa 1986); Michigan, see Jordan v. Sinai Hosp., 171 Mich. App. 328, 348,
429 N.W.2d 891, 900 (1988) (Michigan originally allowed ex parte interviews, see Gailitis v. Bassett,
5 Mich. App. 382, 383, 146 N.W.2d 708, 709 (1966), but the Michigan court changed its position in
Jordan.); Minnesota, see Wenninger v. Muesing, 307 Minn. 405, 411-12, 240 N.W.2d 333, 337
(1976); Missouri, see State ex rel Woytus v. Ryan, 776 S.W.2d 389, 395 (Mo. 1989) (en banc);
Montana, see Jaap v. District Court, 191 Mont. 319, 324, 623 P.2d 1389, 1392 (1981); New Hampshire, see Nelson v. Lewis, 130 N.H. 106, 111, 534 A.2d 720, 723 (1987); New Mexico, see Smith v.
Ashby, 106 N.M. 358, 360, 743 P.2d 114, 116 (1987) (particularly noteworthy because physicianpatient privilege has been abolished); New York, see Anker v. Brodnitz, 98 Misc. 2d 148, 149, 413
N.Y.S.2d 582,584 (1979), aff'd, 73 A.D.2d 589, 422 N.Y.S.2d 887, appealdismissed, 51 N.Y.2d 743,
411 N.E.2d 783, 432 N.Y.S.2d 364 (1980); Oklahoma, see Johnson v. District Court, 738 P.2d 151,
153 (Okla. 1987); Pennsylvania, see Alexander v. Knight, 197 Pa. Super. 79, 80, 177 A.2d 142, 146
(1962); Washington, see Loudon v. Mhyre, 110 Wash. 2d 675, 677, 756 P.2d 138, 142 (1988); Wisconsin, see State ex reL Klieger v. Alby, 125 Wis. 2d 468, 473-74, 373 N.W.2d 57, 61 (Wis. Ct. App.
1983); and the federal district courts for the District of North Dakota, see Weaver v. Mann, 90
F.R.D. 443, 445 (D.N.D. 1981), and the Middle District of Pennsylvania, see Manion v. N.P.W.
Medical Center, Inc., 676 F. Supp. 585, 588 (M.D. Pa. 1987). The District of Alaska also refused to
restrict ex parte interviews in Garner v. Ford Motor Co., 61 F.R.D. 22, 24 (D. Alaska 1977). See
supra note 51.
73. There are a variety of situations in which that physician-patient privilege may be found
inapplicable. Waiver may be automatic upon filing a suit in which an aspect of the plaintiff's medical condition is an issue, eg., Jaap, 191 Mont. at 319, 623 P.2d at 1390-91, or the plaintiff may waive
the privilege by discussing privileged matters, Klieger, 125 Wis. 2d at 473-74, 373 N.W.2d at 60. Of
course, if the privilege is still in effect, the defense attorney cannot approach the physician
informally.
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court ordered participation in informal discovery. 74 In addition, they have relied heavily on the public policies favoring the physician-patient relationship. 75

Finally, these courts make it clear that although they do not disapprove of informal interviews in general, they will neither allow defendants to contact the phy76
sicians as a matter of course nor order plaintiffs to permit informal interviews.
In Petrillo v. Syntex Laboratories,Inc., 77 a products liability case, the Illinois Court of Appeals found the reasoning of courts that allow informal discov-

ery unpersuasive and refused to order ex parte interviews. 78 The court, noting
that there was no prohibition on ex parte interviews in effect, 79 focused instead
on a number of policy concerns in deciding to restrict discovery.8 0 The court
reasoned that the advantage gained from allowing ex parte interviews is not

great and that the defendant "failed... to identify a single piece of information
or evidence which he is able to obtain through an ex parte conference that he
cannot obtain via the conventional methods of discovery."' 8 1 The court was not

convinced that informal discovery facilitated early settlement of claims. 82 Thus,
the court argued that it is the information, not the method by which it is obtained, that fuels the settlement process and that a defendant can discover the
83
same facts through medical records or depositions.
The court did acknowledge that depositions are more expensive than infor-

mal interviews, but suggested that written depositions serve to keep costs

down.8 4 In addition, defendant can obtain plaintiff's medical records. 85 Expert

witnesses preparing to testify can review these records and are therefore not
overly handicapped by the lack of direct contact with the plaintiff's treating
74. Klieger, 125 Wis. 2d at 474, 373 N.W.2d at 61 ("[B]y creating the codes of evidence and
civil procedure, our supreme court has determined that these discovery tools adequately protect
plaintiffs' interests while affording defendants the best opportunity to discover facts."). Accord
Weaver, 90 F.R.D. at 445; Wenninger, 307 Minn. at 410-11, 240 N.W.2d at 335; Jaap, 191 Mont. at
323-24, 623 P.2d at 1390-91; Anker, 98 Misc. 2d at 149, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 583; Johnson, 738 P.2d at
153.
75. See, eg., Petrillo, 148 Il. App. 3d at 587, 499 N.E.2d at 957 ("[W]e believe that modem
public policy strongly favors the confidential and fiduciary relationship existing between a patient
and his physician.").
76. Most of these courts encourage the practice of informal interviews if both parties are able to
come to an agreement. See, eg., Wenninger, 367 Minn. at 411-12, 240 N.W.2d at 337; Woytus, 776
S.W.2d at 394; Jaap, 191 Mont. at 324, 623 P.2d at 1392; Klieger, 125 Wis. 2d at 475, 373 N.W.2d at
61.
77. 148 Ill. App. 3d 581, 499 N.E.2d 952 (1986), appeal denied, 113 I11.2d 584, 505 N.E.2d
361, cert denied sub nonm Tobin v. Petrillo, 483 U.S. 1007 (1987).
78. Id. at 609, 499 N.E.2d at 971.
79. The Illinois legislature had passed a bill restricting discovery from a physician to the formal
methods of discovery, but Illinois' governor had not signed it yet, and therefore it was not controlling. Id. at 585 n.2, 499 N.E.2d at 955 n.2.
80. Id. at 587-93, 499 N.E.2d at 557-59.
81. Id. at 586-87, 499 N.E.2d at 956; accord Woytus, 776 S.W.2d at 394; Nelson v. Lewis, 130
N.H. 106, 111, 534 A.2d 720, 723 (1987); Anker v. Brodnitz, 98 Misc. 2d 148, 149, 413 N.Y.S.2d
582, 584 (1979), aff'd, 73 A.D.2d 589, 422 N.Y.S.2d 887, appeal dismissed, 51 N.Y.2d 743, 411
N.E.2d 783, 432 N.Y.S.2d 364 (1980).
82. Petrillo, 148 Il. App. 3d at 601, 499 N.E.2d at 965.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 596-97, 499 N.E.2d at 964.
85. Id.; accord Smith v. Ashby, 106 N.M. 358, 360, 743 P.2d 114, 115 (1987).
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physician.8 6 As a practical matter, if a number of treating physicians appear on
the witness list, a defendant may decide that depositions are necessary only for

those physicians who have treated plaintiff for a significant amount of time or
whose records indicate that further investigation may be fruitful. The court rea-

soned that there is no prejudice to the defendant; although the plaintiff may have
more access to a physician, she cannot control what the physician will say in a
3 7
deposition because the physician still has a duty to speak truthfully.
The Petrillo court then discussed the importance of the confidential and
fiduciary relationship between the physician and the patient that survives the

waiver of privilege.38 Although the plaintiff may implicitly agree to disclosure
of medical information upon filing the lawsuit,8 9 the Illinois court disagreed that

the plaintiff's doctor is permitted to do more than make necessary information
available through testimony or deposition. 90 Motions or orders after the fact
would not be adequate to protect the plaintiff or restore her confidence in her
physician after the conversations with the defendant have occurred. 9 1
Other courts also have expressed concern over the lack of protections available in the informal interview setting. In Duquette v. Superior Court92 the de-

fendant in a medical malpractice case conducted ex parte interviews with
93
thirteen of the plaintiff's treating physicians without the plaintiff's consent.

The defendant then listed a number of these physicians as his witnesses.94 The
Arizona Court of Appeals agreed both that there had been an implied waiver
when plaintiff filed suit 95 and that there were advantages to informal discov-

ery. 96 Nevertheless, the court held that ex parte interviews without the plaintiff's consent were improper. 97 The Duquette court quoted approvingly the
Petrillo court's assessment of the issues, among others.98
In addition, the Duquette court addressed the effect of ex parte interviews
on the physician. 99 The physician has a duty under the Hippocratic Oath °° to
86. Petrillo, 148 111.
App. 3d at 597, 499 N.E.2d at 965.
87. Id.; accord Manion v. N.P.W. Medical Center, Inc., 676 F. Supp. 585, 588 (M.D. Pa. 1987).
88. Petrillo, 148 Ill.
App. 3d at 594, 499 N.E.2d at 957.
89. Id. at 593, 499 N.E.2d at 957.
90. Id. at 595, 499 N.E.2d at 961-62.
91. Id. at 601, 499 N.E.2d at 966.
92. 161 Ariz. 269, 778 P.2d 634 (Ct. App. 1989).
93. Id. at 270, 778 P.2d at 635.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 272, 778 P.2d at 637.
96. Id. at 273, 778 P.2d at 638.
97. Id. at 277, 778 P.2d at 642.
98. Id. at 275, 778 P.2d at 641.
99. See id. at 276, 778 P.2d at 640-41.
100. This is the ethical oath taken by all physicians. It provides in relevant part: "whatever in
connection with my professional practice ...I see or hear in the life of men which ought not to be
spoken of abroad I will not divulge as reckoning that all such should be kept secret." Petrillo v.
Syntex Laboratories, 148 Ill. App. 3d 581, 589, 499 N.E.2d 952, 957-58 (1986), appeal denied, 113
Ill. 2d 584, 505 N.E.2d 361, cert. denied sub nor., Tobin v. Petrillo, 483 U.S. 1007 (1987).
Courts also frequently cite the American Medical Association's PRINCIPLES OF MEDICAL ETHics, see, e.g., Duquette, 161 Ariz. at 276 n.8, 778 P.2d at 641 n.8; Petrillo, 148 Ill.
App. 3d at 588-89,
499 N.E. 2d at 957-58, but the document is not as helpful as courts often imply. The relevant
section, § 5.05, provides that "[t]he information disclosed to a physician during the course of the
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keep confidential information she receives from her patient. Because breaching

this confidence may not only be unethical but also may constitute a legal violation, it is that much more important to protect the physician from improperly
revealing medical information outside the scope of the waiver. 10 1 Other courts
have agreed that determining whether a question relates to information that a
doctor may discuss properly is a legal question that is difficult to answer on an
ad hoc basis: "Placing the burden of determining relevancy on an attorney, who
does not know the nature of the confidential disclosure about to be elicited, is
risky. Asking the physician, untrained in the law, to assume this burden is a
greater gamble and is unfair to the physician." 10 2 The possibility that a physi-

cian may be unaware of the freedom to refuse to participate in informal discovery led the Duquette court to conclude that it is in the best interests of physicians
to restrict ex parte contact. 103
Some courts also have pointed out that the presence of medical malpractice
in many of these cases in which the defense seeks an ex parte interview adds
another dimension to the physician's burden. In Manion v. N.P.W. Medical
Center, Inc.104 the federal district court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
was unwilling to ignore the current fear of malpractice suits and liability:
[a]n unauthorized exparte interview could disintegrate into a discussion of the impact of a jury's award upon a physician's professional
reputation, the rising cost of malpractice insurance premiums, the notion that the treating physician might be the next person to be sued,
and other topics which might influence the treating physician's views.
The potential for impropriety grows even larger when defense counsel
relationship between the physician and patient is confidential to the greatest possible degree.... The
physician should not reveal confidential communications or information without the express consent
of the patient unless required to do so by law." COUNCIL ON ETHICAL AND JUDICIAL AFFAIRS,

AMERICAN MEDICAL ASS'N, CURRENT OPINIONS OF THE COUNCIL ON ETHICAL AND JUDICIAL
AFFAIRS OF THE AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION § 5.05 (1986). Because this does not specify

what the law is or should be, however, it could be complied with as equally in a jurisdiction that
allows ex parte contact as in one that restricts them.
101. Duquette, 161 Ariz. at 276, 778 P.2d at 641; Wenninger v. Muesing, 307 Minn. 405, 411,
240 N.W.2d 333, 337 (1976); Anker v. Brodnitz, 98 Misc. 2d 148, 152-53, 413 N.Y.S.2d 582, 585
(1979), aff'd, 73 A.D.2d 589, 422 N.Y.S.2d 887, appeal dismissed, 51 N.Y.2d 743, 411 N.E.2d 783,
432 N.Y.S.2d 364 (1980). The North Carolina Court of Appeals has allowed recovery in an action
for unauthorized disclosure. Watts v. Cumberland County Hosp. Sys., 75 N.C. App. 1, 9-12, 330
S.E.2d 242, 248-50, disc rev. denied as to additionalissues, 314 N.C. 548, 335 S.E.2d 27 (1985), rev'd
in part on other grounds, 317 N.C. 321, 345 S.E.2d 201 (1986).
Perhaps the worst result on this issue is the position taken by at least one court that allows cx
parte interviews. See Coralluzzo v. Fass, 450 So. 2d 858, 859 (Fla. 1984). The Coralluzzo decision
provides that if there is a breach of confidence during an ex parte interview, plaintiff's cause of
action is against the physician. Id. It seems inherently unfair that a physician, who knows neither
substantive law nor the rules of evidence, and who is interviewed by opposing counsel, who does
know the law, should be liable for an improper disclosure.
For general information on the issue of liability for improper disclosure of confidences by a
physician see Note, Legal Protectionof the ConfidentialNature of the Physician-PatientRelationship,
52 COLUM. L. REv. 383, 397-98 (1952); Note, MedicalPracticeand the Right to Privacy, 43 MINN.
L. REv. 943 (1959).
102. Roosevelt Hotel Ltd. Partnership v. Sweeney, 394 N.W.2d 353, 356 (Iowa 1986); accord
Duquette, 161 Ariz. at 276-77, 778 P.2d at 641 (determining what is open to discussion "places both
the defense attorney and the physician in an untenable position").
103. Duquette, 161 Ariz. at 275-76, 778 P.2d at 641.
104. 676 F. Supp. 585, 594-95 (M.D. Pa. 1987).
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represents the treating physician's own insurance carrier. 10 5
Courts have agreed that the best way to avoid this awkward and difficult situa-

tion is to err on the side of caution by restricting contact between defense coun10 6
sel and the physician to times when the plaintiff's attorney is also present.

In balancing the needs of the discovery process and the confidential nature

of the physician-patient relationship, courts restricting ex parte interviews find
that, even after a plaintiff waives the physician-patient privilege, a confidential or
fiduciary relationship remains and is worthy ofjudicial protection. 10 7 The plain-

tiff must expect that her physician will make records available and give depositions or testimony if necessary, but also can expect the doctor to keep other

confidences. 10 8 A critical aspect of this position is the idea that the concerns
surrounding discovery and privilege are distinct: the privilege regulates what

information may be disclosed whereas discovery regulates how it may be
disclosed. 10 9
The North Carolina Supreme Court's resolution of this issue has been antic-

ipated for three years. 110 In approaching the question of whether the law should

allow ex parte interviews, the court had many valid arguments to consider. The
court concluded that it favored the public policy behind protecting the physician-patient relationship and held "that defense counsel may not interview plain-

tiff's nonparty treating physicians privately without plaintiff's express consent.
Defendant instead must utilize the statutorily recognized methods of discovery
enumerated in N.C.G.S. § 1A-l, Rule 26."111

The Crist court rested its conclusion on many of the public policy arguments discussed above. It did not, however, introduce any new arguments, nor

did it give detailed consideration to the practical effects of discovery restrictions.
The court began by noting that "[t]he emerging consensus adheres to the position that defense counsel is limited to formal methods of discovery," '1 12 and that

this limitation is largely the result of" 'an emerging court-created effort to preserve the treating physician's fiduciary responsibilities during the litigation pro105. Id at 594-95; accord Duquette, 161 Ariz. at 276, 778 P.2d at 641; Anker v. Brodnitz, 98
Misc. 2d 148, 153, 413 N.Y.S.2d 582, 585 (1979), aff'd, 73 A.D.2d 589, 422 N.Y.S.2d 887, appeal
dismissed, 51 N.Y.2d 743, 411 N.E.2d 783, 432 N.Y.S.2d 364 (1980).
106. See Wenninger v. Muesing, 307 Minn. 405, 411-12, 240 N.W.2d 333, 337 (1976); Jaap v.
District Court, 191 Mont. 319, 324, 623 P.2d 1389, 1392 (1981) (requiring plaintiff to be present);
Anker, 98 Misc. 2d at 153, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 585-86.
107. Duquette, 161 Ariz. at 275, 778 P.2d at 640; Alexander v. Knight, 177 A.2d 142, 146 (Pa.
Super. 1962); Jordan v. Sinai Hosp., 171 Mich. App. 328, 344, 429 N.W.2d 891, 899 (1988).
108. Hammonds v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 243 F. Supp. 793, 799 (N.D. Ohio 1965); Petrillo
v. Syntex Laboratories, 148 Ill. App. 3d 581, 595, 499 N.E.2d 952, 961-62 (1986), appeal denied, 113
Ill. 2d 584, 505 N.E.2d 361, cert. denied sub nom., Tobin v. Petrillo, 483 U.S. 1007 (1987).
109. Manion v. N.P.W. Medical Center, Inc., 676 F. Supp. 585, 593 (M.D. Pa. 1987).
110. In 1987 the court noted that the parties had tried to raise the issue of the propriety of ex
parte interviews, but since neither had properly presented the issue, the court did not address it.
Cates v. Wilson, 321 N.C. 1, 17 n.2, 361 S.E.2d 734, 744 n.2 (1987).
111. Crist, 326 N.C. at 336, 389 S.E.2d at 47. For the text of N.C.R. Civ. PRO. 26(a), see infra
note 119.

112. Crist, 326 N.C. at 332, 389 S.E.2d at 45.
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cess.'"113 The court then discussed the differences between the statutory
privilege and a prohibition on ex parte interviews. The purpose of the privilege
is to encourage a patient's full disclosure of information necessary for treatment.
The rule against ex parte contacts between the defense attorney and the nonparty treating physician, on the other hand, is broader. 114
The confidential nature of the relationship is "[tihe primary policy reason
against allowing ex parte interviews." '1 15 The court pointed to the ethical duty
of the physician to keep information confidential and patients' belief in this protection. 116 This expectation of confidentiality, the court decided, is not derived
solely from the statutory physician-patient privilege and continues despite the
discovery of the patient's medical information during a lawsuit.1 17 The North
Carolina Supreme Court also considered it important that a violation of confidences can expose the physician to liability and noted, as have other courts, that
deciding what is permissible to discuss is often difficult.' 18
In addition to discussing policy rationales for protecting the physician-patient relationship, the court examined the North Carolina discovery rules. Ex
parte interviews are not one of the methods of discovery the North Carolina
Rules of Civil Procedure authorize. 119 The court recognized the potential for
added costs of discovery, but suggested that depositions upon written questions
and discovery of medical records provide an adequate remedy. 120 The high cost
of depositions is an extremely important issue, one that the North Carolina
Supreme Court dismissed too quickly. The costs of litigation are already high.
Courts restricting ex parte contacts have summarily dismissed the expense of
scheduling additional depositions without knowing in advance if the witness has
anything important to say. The merits of the issue at least deserve more
thoughtful consideration.
The Crist court also failed to address some of the more remote effects of
limiting discovery. For example, the cost of malpractice insurance is likely to
increase as the cost of defending malpractice suits rises due to increased discovery costs. Nor did the court consider the practical effects of the restriction, such
as an increased likelihood that plaintiffs' attorneys may limit their witnesses to
treating physicians. The privilege also covers actions by nurses or other employ113. Id. at 333, 389 S.E.2d at 45 (quoting Manion v. N.P.W. Medical Center, Inc., 676 F. Supp.

585, 593 (M.D. Pa. 1987)).
114. Id

115. Id. at 333, 389 S.E.2d at 46.
116. Id. at 333-34, 389 S.E.2d at 46 (citing discussion of ethical guidelines of medical profession
in Duquette and Petrillo); see supra notes 99-103 and accompanying text.
117. Id.; see supra text accompanying notes 88-91.
118. Crist, 326 N.C. at 335-36 & n.3, 389 S.E.2d at 47 & n.3; see supra notes 101-03 and accompanying text.

119. Crist, 326 N.C. at 334 n.2, 389 S.E.2d at 46 n.2. The North Carolina Rules of Civil Proce-

dure state: "Parties may obtain discovery by one or more of the following methods: depositions

upon oral examination or written questions; written interrogatories; production of documents or
things or permission to enter upon land or other property, for inspection and other purposes; physi-

cian and mental examinations; and requests for admission." N.C.R. CIV. PRo. 26(a).

120. Crist, 326 N.C. at 335, 389 S.E.2d at 46; see supra notes 84-87 and accompanying text. In
this case, the plaintiff had turned over copies of her medical records. Crist, 326 N.C. at 328, 389
S.E.2d at 42-43.
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ees done at the direction of a physician. 12 1 Although these, people can testify
about the facts and circumstances of plaintiff's condition, defense counsel cannot interview them and may not order depositions given both the number of
personnel who may participate in a patient's care and the uncertainty about
whether any one individual may contribute valuable information. Moreover, no
court has considered that one of the results of denying ex parte interviews may
be a trial in which a plaintiff's attorney calls no fact witnesses. If plaintiff's case
is not particularly strong, he may not call his treating physicians as witnesses
because he thinks their testimony would be damaging. If defendant cannot af-

ford depositions, defendant may never find out what these fact witnesses may
have to contribute. Even in a strong case where plaintiff calls fact witnesses,
defendant may not have talked with them in advance. Medical records are not a
complete substitute. 122
The Crist court stressed that its decision did not affect the kind of information that the defense can discover from plaintiff, only the methods. Nevertheless, the court concluded, the balance between the search for truth and the
concern for the physician-patient relationship comes down in favor of restriction: "We conclude that considerations of patient privacy, the confidential relationship between doctor and patient, the adequacy of formal discovery devices,
and the untenable position in which ex parte contacts place the nonparty physician supersede defendant's interest in a less expensive and more convenient
method of discovery." 12 3 The Crist court upheld the trial court's order requiring the defense attorney to turn over to the plaintiff notes of the two ex parte
interviews that had taken place. 124 This order fell within the discretion of the
trial court to govern the trial and issue remedial orders to avoid injustice. 125
The court also rejected the suggestion that the physician is responsible for improper disclosure. 126 Finally, the court made clear that it did not intend to
discourage informal discovery methods if both sides agree to them.127
As mentioned above, the court did not posit any new arguments for restricting discovery from treating physicians. Instead, it restated the arguments
other courts have considered and joined the majority rule. The balance between
the confidential concerns of the physician-patient relationship and unfettered
discovery does seem to favor some restrictions on ex parte interviews. Unlike
the formal methods, it is more difficult for a party to know if a defense attorney's
question or the desired information exceeds the bounds of permissible discovery.
Situations involving confidential or fiduciary relationships only heighten the
concern over the possibility of improper discovery. These informal interviews,
121. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.

122. In Crist the plaintiff did not call any fact witnesses, nor was the defense able to speak with
more than 100 attending nurses and 30 treating physicians. Letter from Isaac N. Northrup, Jr.,
defendant's attorney, to Elizabeth Eggleston Drigotas (Oct. 19, 1990).
123. Crist, 326 N.C. at 336, 389 S.E.2d at 47.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 337, 389 S.E.2d at 48.
126. Id.; see supra note 101.
127. Crist, 326 N.C. at 336, 389 S.E.2d at 47.
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however, are very common and are a critical part of keeping discovery costs
down. Courts should consider carefully any limitation on informal discovery.
Although the Crist court carefully weighed the policy arguments, it did not
give full consideration to the practical effects of its decision. Instead of requiring
formal discovery for all of plaintiff's treating physicians, or any other medical
professional who would fall under the physician-patient privilege, the court
should have considered whether a narrower restriction would have protected the
confidential relationship and promoted inexpensive, efficient discovery. For example, the concerns of a conflict of interest are most acute when the ex parte
contact occurs with the plaintiff's current treating physician. For the physician
to be speaking with his patient's opponent while at the same time receiving confidential information from the patient clearly violates that relationship. In cases
involving a former physician, however, the relationship has come to an end.
While a former physician obviously still has confidential information from that
relationship, he also is one of the critical fact witnesses to the case and therefore
should be available to both parties. It therefore might be desirable for the court
to allow ex parte interviews to take place with physicians other than the plaintiff's current treating physician, but require the defense attorney to provide prior
notice to the plaintiff's attorney. Notice would allow the plaintiff's attorney to
explain the scope of the physician's mandatory participation in the interview as
well as the issues involved, thereby reducing the risk of improper disclosure.
Improper influence by either side could be remedied by the court. Thus,
although the court seems to have reached the correct decision, it could have
tailored more narrowly the protections it granted to suit the needs of all sides.
The difficulties involved for the medical profession are certainly not to be
overlooked. The physician is likely to be subject to a number of different pressures. North Carolina has essentially two malpractice insurance carriers 128 so
defendant's insurer may also insure the nonparty treating physician. The physician will also be aware of the costs of malpractice cases and increased insurance
premiums and therefore may be inclined to help the insurance carrier avoid liability. In addition, defendant may well be a colleague for whom the physician
feels great sympathy as he undergoes a malpractice defense. Both sides will
place pressures on the physician, either through interviews or depositions.
Moreover, nonparty treating physicians, in some cases, actually have joined
129
forces with the defense, for example by agreeing to serve as an expert witness.
128. Amicus Curiae Brief for the North Carolina Academy of Trial Lawyers at 27, Crist, (No.
69PA89).

129. In Manion v. N.P.W. Medical Center, Inc., 676 F. Supp 585 (M.D. Pa. 1987), the plaintiff
was hurt in a fall. He then sued his physicians alleging that they negligently failed to realize he had
fractured his spine. Id. at 585. The plaintiff's treating physician originally agreed that the fracture
should have been diagnosed. Id. at 586-87. After the treating physician was interviewed by the
defendant physician and his attorney, however, the treating physician wrote to the plaintiff saying
the fracture was not visible and the defendant physician's treatment was proper. Id. at 587. The
treating physician had been represented by the defendant physician's attorney when he was earlier
sued for malpractice. Id. at 587 n.1. Notwithstanding a previous offer of assistance, the treating
physician also refused to meet with the plaintiff's attorney. Id. at 587. The defense attorney subsequently met with the plaintiff's other treating physician, who also refused to speak with the plaintiff's attorney thereafter. Id. Manion was decided under Pennsylvania law. The court also
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Although these are valid and extremely important concerns, they do not compel
an absolute ban on ex parte contacts. Such a ban may actually increase malpractice insurance costs. These concerns can be met by controlling a more limited
access to former physicians combined with notice to the plaintiff's attorney.
The potential effects of a broad restriction on ex parte interviews in a confidential situation extend beyond the medical profession. The physician-patient
privilege is not the only privilege in North Carolina. 130 Privileges also exist for
communications between clergymen and communicants, 13 1 psychologists and
clients, 132 school counselors and students, 133 marital family therapists and cli136
ents, 134 social workers and clients, 135 professional counselors and clients,
husbands and wives in civil actions, 137 and attorneys and clients. 138 A plaintiff
may waive any of these statutory privileges during the course of litigation and
the opposing side may want to interview the confidant informally. 139 Furthermore, many of the courts that restrict ex parte interviews, as well as the North
Carolina Supreme Court, speak of the importance of the underlying confidential
or fiduciary nature of the physician-patient relationship as one of the primary
reasons for restricting informal contact. Confidential or fiduciary relationships
that are not protected by statute, such as those between parent and child or
among siblings, are similar to confidential relationships protected by privilege
once that privilege is waived. Does this mean that ex parte interviews should be
impermissible when any confidential or fiduciary relationship is present?
The answer must be no. Each different privilege may rest on arguments
that are equally compelling as those advanced in Crist. There seems to be no
real distinction between the psychiatrist, who is covered under Crist, and the
discussed a number of Pennsylvania lower court cases in which the defense was able to enlist the
plaintiff's treating physician as an expert witness. Id. at 587 n.2.
In Green v. Maness, 69 N.C. App. 403, 316 S.E.2d 911, disc rev. denied, 312 N.C. 621, 323
S.E.2d 921 (1984), the defense was able to hire one of the plaintiff's treating physicians and another
physician who had been consulted by the plaintiff and who had reviewed the medical records as
expert witnesses. The court questioned the propriety of the witnesses' conduct, but did not disqualify them from testifying. Id. at 411, 316 S.E.2d at 916.
130. See Note, Privileges: 1983 Revisions to Evidence Law in North Carolina, 62 N.C.L. REv.
1314 (1984); Note, supra note 27, at 630.
131. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-53.2 (1986). For additional information on North Carolina law, see
Note, The Clergy-CommunicantPrivilege: Blessed Are the Meek For They Shall Remain Silent, 65
N.C.L. REv. 1390 (1987).
132. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-53.3 (Supp. 1990).

133. Id. § 8-53.4.
134. Id. § 8-53.5.
135. Id. § 8-53.7.
136. Id. § 8-53.8.
137. Id. § 8-56. For further information on the husband and wife privilege, see Note, Pillow
Talk, Grimgribbers,and ConnubialBliss: The Marital Communication Pivilege, 56 IND. L.J. 121
(1980); Note, Evidence-PrivilegedCommunications Between Husband and Wife, 46 N.C.L. Rnv.
643 (1968).
138. This is not a statutory privilege, but a common law privilege that North Carolina courts
recognize. See, ag., Dobias v. White, 240 N.C. 680, 684-85, 83 S.E.2d 785, 788 (1954).
139. Three of these privileges, clergy-communicant, husband-wife, and attorney-client, are absolute and only the party holding the privilege can waive it. Six of the privileges are qualified: physician-patient, psychologist-client, school counselor-student, marital therapist-client, social workerclient, and professional counselor-client. A presiding judge can compel disclosure if necessary to the
proper administration of justice. See statutes cited supra in notes 131-37.
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psychologist, who is not because his privilege derives from a different section of
the statutes. Certainly, the patient is not likely to distinguish between the two
when deciding which confidences to reveal. Nor is there any difference in the
general principles behind the privilege: both are designed to encourage full disclosure to facilitate proper treatment. With the attorney-client privilege, however, the arguments for restricting ex parte interviews are not as strong.
Presumably, the attorney would be much better than the physician at determining whether something is proper for discussion. It is still difficult to determine
the extent of a waiver in any given case, but the attorney will be more acutely
aware of this fact, and therefore more careful in his informal disclosure. Nor are
attorneys, of course, unaware of the dangers of malpractice actions.
This discussion simply illustrates that for each privilege, the law and the
policies must undergo the same rigorous analysis that courts have applied to the
physician-patient privilege. This is not to say that no other privilege will merit
restriction. It is only to point out that informal discovery is an important part of
the adversarial system. The courts are now beginning to limit ex parte contact
in certain well defined situations. Expansion of these restrictions by analogy is
simply inadequate. Needless to say, the scrutiny must be even more exacting in
the case of a confidential or fiduciary relationship not protected by a statutory
privilege.
Restricting ex parte interviews of a nonparty treating physician will have an
impact on litigation involving medical issues. The Crist court could have minimized this impact by limiting the restrictions to ex parte contact with the plaintiff's current treating physician. Even so, parties may be able to lessen the
impact of Crist by agreeing among themselves to a system of informal discovery.
Moreover, the presiding judge's ability to compel disclosure of medical records
further cushions the decision's impact. Although restricting ex parte interviews
with a nonparty treating physician may be the solution of choice for the physician-patient privilege, the courts should resist any temptation to expand the doctrine of Crist beyond the physician-patient setting without a serious and careful
examination of the law and policies present in each of the different privileged
situations.
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